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Warranting Rightful Claims
Karen E. Sandrik*
ABSTRACT
Damage awards for patent infringement have sky-rocketed and
sparked significant debate in recent years. A part of this patent
damage debate focuses on non-practicing entities, or so-called
“patent trolls.” A patent troll is a patent owner that demands a
royalty based on patented technology yet does not actually use the
technology to provide an end product or service. Their strategy is
simple: create nuisance and inflict fear. Patent trolls employ this
strategy against the buyers of goods that use or practice the
patented technology. Increasingly, buyers are availing themselves
of the “warranty against infringement” (“WAI”) in sales contracts
under the Uniform Commercial Code when sued by patent owners
for alleged patent infringement. The WAI provides a guarantee
that goods bought or sold in a given transaction are free from a
“rightful” third-party infringement claim when delivered. A party
protected by the WAI can receive an indemnity of sorts from the
other party for costs and damages associated with expensive and
high-risk patent infringement suits.
Under the current definition of rightful, the mere threat of
litigation is sufficient to trigger protection under the WAI. As
damage awards for patent actions continue to fall consistently in
the million-dollar-plus range, and patent trolls target dozens of
companies at one time, this low threshold for determining when a
rightful claim exists opens the door for litigious, and perhaps
abusive, conduct on the state level. Scholars have overlooked the
significance of the WAI because of the unique blend of two areas of
law: intellectual property and commercial law. This Article
corrects this oversight. It argues that courts should adopt a new
framework for determining when a rightful claim has been made
against a buyer or seller, therefore providing the buyer or seller
protection under the WAI.
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INTRODUCTION
Damage awards for patent infringement have sky-rocketed and
sparked significant debate in recent years.1 Although Congress
1. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2010 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: THE
CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF PATENT DAMAGES LAW 8 (2010), available at http://
www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2010-patent-litigationstudy.pdf [hereinafter PWC PATENT LITIGATION STUDY] (highlighting two awards
of over $1.5 billion); Barnaby J. Feder, Boston Scientific Loses Patent Suit But
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recently passed the America Invents Act (“Act”), the Act fails to
address these increasingly-high damage awards.2 A part of this
patent damage debate focuses on the non-practicing entity (NPE),
or so-called “patent troll.”3 “A favorite villain,” the patent troll is a
patent owner that demands a royalty based on patented technology
yet does not actually use the technology to provide an end product
or service.4 This lack of personal investment enables the troll to be
less risk-averse than patent owners who rely on using the
technology and, therefore, more likely to take risks in alleging
patent infringement.5 Patent trolls are known for aggressive and
opportunistic behavior.6 Their strategy is simple: create nuisance
and inflict fear. A common response upon receiving a cease-anddesist letter from a patent troll is to pay the nuisance, the troll, to
go away; this is accomplished through a license-based settlement.
One of the most famous patent licensing campaigns resulted in a

Plans to Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008 at C10, (discussing Dr. Bruce
Saffran’s $431 million win against Boston Scientific). Scholars have also played a
part in this debate. See e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88
TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010); David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the
Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2009); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent
Holdup, Patent Remedies and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009).
2. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/
issues_patentreformact2011.html.
3. See John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent
Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2007); see also John R. Allison, Mark
A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value of Trolls on Top? The
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
4. Golden, supra note 3, at 2112 (trolls charge a “price for authorizing the
work of others”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“Defining a patent troll
has proven a tricky business, but that does not mean the problem does not
exist.”).
5. See Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 443 (2007) (finding patent troll will more likely
“roll the dice and ‘game’ the patent system”).
6. “Patent troll” was apparently coined after “patent extortionist” invoked
an action for libel. Golden, supra note 3, at 2112 n.7. Another account states the
term “patent troll” was first used by Peter Detkin of Intel Corporation to
describe small companies suing Intel for patent infringement and achieving
“nuisance-value settlements.” Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme
Court’s eBay Decision Sets Back Pesky ‘Patent Trolls’ or American Innovation
Depending Upon Which Side You Are On, 92 A.B.A. J. 50 (2006).
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patent owner receiving $1.5 billion in licensing fees for patents
that were ultimately deemed invalid and unenforceable.7
In the shadows of the controversy surrounding high damage
awards, aggressive patent trolls, and patent reform proposals,
defendants in patent infringement actions are seeking
indemnification-type protection under contractual provisions and
sales warranties.8 Increasingly, buyers of goods using patented
technology are availing themselves of the “warranty against
infringement” (WAI) provided by the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) when sued by patent owners for alleged patent
infringement.9 The WAI provides a guarantee that goods bought or
sold in a given transaction are free from a rightful third-party
infringement claim when delivered.10 The party protected by the
WAI can receive an indemnity of sorts from the other party for
costs and damages associated with defending an infringement
suit.11
For example, suppose Big-MP3 Co. (“Big”), a widget designer
and manufacturer, buys one-fourth of the microchips it uses in
these widgets from Sal’s Supply Co. (“Sal’s”). Big spends roughly
one million dollars purchasing these microchips and incorporating
them into the widgets. A year after buying and incorporating these
microchips, Big receives a cease-and-desist letter from TP-Chip
(“TP”), an unknown third party. TP asserts that the microchips
used in Big’s widgets infringe patented technology that it owns. TP
demands that Big either stop using the microchips and pay it
damages for infringement up to that point, or enter a license
7. The infamous “Lemelson suits” are discussed in Part I.B and illustrate
the type of abuse that states should seek to avoid by adopting the proposed
framework for enforcing the WAI.
8. “Indemnification-type” is used here because these actions are not
strictly limited to indemnification or cover of litigation–settlement costs;
consequential damages may be recoverable, as well. See infra Part 1.
9. See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002). The WAI also provides a cause of action
for a seller when a buyer gives the seller “specifications” for the goods that it
wants manufactured. See id. Further, the WAI covers claims of trademark and
copyright infringement. See id.; see also Dolari Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662
F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating WAI protects against patent,
trademark, and copyright claims). This Article focuses on third-party claims of
patent infringement, but it will address trademark and copyright claims in Part IV.
10. See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002). Note the definition of goods as defined
by U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2011) does not include intellectual or intangible property.
The goods being sold here are physical, tangible goods thereby placing the sale
under the jurisdiction of the UCC; yet, it is the fact that these goods also
potentially infringe an intellectual property right that invokes the WAI’s
protection.
11. This indemnity can be for copyright, trademark, or patent infringement.
See infra Part I.
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agreement with it so that Big may continue using its current
microchips without risk of suit. If Big refuses both options, TP
threatens to file a patent infringement suit.
What should Big do? Should Big risk expensive litigation and a
potentially devastating damage award or hope that TP is bluffing
and will not file suit? Or should Big just settle and avoid the
expense and risk of patent litigation? Either way, the WAI may
entitle Big to damages against Sal’s if a court finds that TP has or
had (if settled) a rightful claim against Big. Of course, Big would
also need to demonstrate that the allegedly infringing microchips
were in fact the ones that Sal’s sold to Big. Before Big makes a
decision about which option to take, Big will want to know what it
means to have a rightful claim under the WAI. Without a rightful
claim, Sal’s will not have breached the WAI, and Big will not be
able to recover from Sal’s.
Unfortunately, there is little guidance as to the meaning of a
rightful claim under the WAI. No definition of rightful exists in the
UCC, and scholars have overlooked this area for two simple
reasons. First, prior to the late 1990s, courts faced few WAI
claims, and, therefore, the WAI drew little attention from scholars
and practitioners. Second, the WAI is a unique hybrid of two
different areas of law: intellectual property and commercial law.
Patent scholars focus on issues that arise under patent law, and
patent law is almost exclusively dealt with on the federal level.12
Conversely, commercial law scholars primarily focus on issues
arising under state law. Also, they may be unlikely to consider the
WAI because of its specific focus on intellectual property law, an
area of law with which few commercial law scholars concern
themselves. Due to this lack of guidance from the statute itself and
little attention from scholars, courts have struggled to reach
consistent results when faced with WAI claims.
For example, a federal court declined to define what a rightful
claim is, yet the court did explain a plaintiff’s “subjective belief
and representation” that a third party’s claim against it is rightful is
insufficient.13 Instead, the federal court explained that courts
should determine whether a claim is rightful by “comparing the
scope of the patents at issue with the allegedly infringing
12. Section 1338 of Title 28 of the United States Code vests exclusive
original jurisdiction with the district courts “of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). Section
1295(a) grants the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from a district court “if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole
or in part, on section 1388 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
13. 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
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products.”14 Under this standard, a federal court will analyze the
merits of TP’s infringement claim before shifting the costs of a
settlement or patent infringement suit from Big to Sal’s. By
contrast, a state court recently stated that a rightful claim is a
“nonfrivolous claim of infringement that has any significant and
adverse effect, through the prospect of litigation or otherwise, on
the buyer’s ability to make use of the purchased goods.”15 This
prospect of litigation may come in the form of a cease-and-desist
letter.16 In other words, this state court held that if a buyer or seller
believes the third-party claim against it is rightful, and it
voluntarily stops using the allegedly infringing goods upon receipt
of a cease-and-desist letter, then it is entitled to damages under a
WAI claim. Following this precedent, a state court will engage in
little analysis of the merit of TP’s infringement suit, as well as
engage in little analysis of whether Big should reasonably believe
that TP has a rightful infringement claim against it.
Under the state court’s broad definition of rightful, the threat of
litigation may be enough to trigger protection under the WAI. As
damage awards for patent actions continue consistently to fall in
the million-dollar-plus range, this low threshold for determining
when a rightful claim has been made (thereby invoking the WAI)
is opening the door for new abuses on the state level. A company
in Big’s position has little incentive to determine if it really does
infringe a third party’s patent. A company needs only to receive a
cease-and-desist letter, purchase a license from the third party or
stop using the allegedly infringing goods and pay past damages,
and then sue the seller of the goods to recover these expenditures.17
Suppose, as often happens, TP sends a cease-and-desist letter
not only to Big, but also to dozens of companies that use
microchips in their end products. Further, suppose TP’s sole
business purpose is to enforce and collect royalty payments based
on its microchip patent portfolio. TP is a patent troll. What is
troubling here is that TP’s patent may not in fact cover the specific
14. Id. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.
15. Pac. Sunwear of Cal. Inc. v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182,
194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.
16. Id.; see also Paul E. McGowan, Strategies for Indemnification under the
U.C.C. Against Claims of Patent Infringement, 21 INTELL. PROP. LIT. 6 (2010).
17. While Big will incur transactional costs in bringing a suit against Sal’s,
this cost is avoidable only if Sal’s agrees to pay TP directly. Very few sellers
will admit this liability upfront to a buyer, let alone to a third party who will
then target the seller, as well. My proposed framework does, however,
encourage more upfront collaboration between buyers and sellers. This
collaboration will also encourage buyers to be more thorough and to bargain
harder with third parties when they know what a seller may not be able to cover.
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microchips used by Big or Big may have a meritorious defense.
Yet TP is betting here that Big, as well as many of the other
targeted companies, will not evaluate the merits of the
infringement claim and the strength of the asserted patent. TP
hopes that Big will simply fear the cost of defending a patent suit
and the risk of a high damage award and decide to meet TP’s
licensing demands.
So, why do we have this type of warranty on the state level,
despite the fact that patent law is usually under the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts?18 How do we define rightful claim so
that patent trolls are discouraged from initiating near-frivolous
infringement actions and that buyers like Big have incentives to
investigate the merit of the infringement claim before being fully
reimbursed for expenses by the warrantor? These questions drive
this project and are magnified by the reality that just one expensive
suit for patent infringement may cause a company to close its
doors.
This Article argues that courts should adopt a more rigorous
standard for determining when a third party has made a rightful
claim against a buyer, thereby entitling a buyer like Big to receive
damages from its seller under the WAI. This stricter standard of
rightful will provoke buyers to take more time when evaluating the
value and strength of the third-party claim against them, and it will
deter opportunistic patent troll behavior. A deeper problem exists
with the WAI. A warranty is a risk-allocation device that places the
risk on the party in the best position to manage it.19 This riskbearing party is said to have superior information, a premise upon
which much of warranty law is based.20 The WAI then assumes
asymmetrical or imperfect information between buyer and seller,
yet this may be unrealistic in the patent context.
This Article proposes a framework that attempts to correct this
fundamental problem with the WAI. This framework interprets
rightful more narrowly and gives courts a method for conducting
intellectual-property-specific analyses. In short, a third-party claim
should be deemed rightful only if it would have a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits at trial. If the buyer settles the
infringement claim with the third party and then looks to the seller
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006) (vesting the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from a district court “if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1388 of this
title”). Section 1338, in turn, vests exclusive original jurisdiction with the
district courts “of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
19. For a more thorough discussion, see infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
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to recover its costs, it should further demonstrate that it acted in
good faith, as defined by the UCC, in entering the settlement. This
requires the buyer to demonstrate he or she was honest and that the
process used in negotiating the settlement terms was objectively
reasonable. When there is both a significant amount of money and
highly sophisticated technology at issue, a court should presume
the third party had a rightful claim. Yet, in these instances the
buyer must still demonstrate that it acted in good faith in reaching
the terms of the settlement with the third party. This standard is
similar to the traditional preliminary-injunction standard that both
state and federal courts use in civil litigation. Because of this
experience with the standard and the balancing that is required,
courts will already have the tools and much of the know-how to
properly implement this framework.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I will discuss the WAI
and highlight what happens when a patent troll targets numerous
companies, specifically buyers of patented technology (like Big)
instead of the manufacturers who are closer to the technology (like
Sal’s). Further, Part I discusses the consequences of the buyer
“playing” with the seller’s money. Part II analyzes recent cases
where courts were faced with defining rightful as used in the WAI.
Part II also illustrates the competing definitions of rightful and
tracks the current trend which requires little of the plaintiff, in this
case Big, the buyer.
Next, Part III discusses three separate theoretical justifications
of warranty law and demonstrates how the unifying thread of these
justifications—informational asymmetry between the parties—may
not always exist with the WAI. Part III then argues that the current
justifications of warranty law are too general to provide a realistic
response for shifting liability to the seller under the WAI. Part IV
proposes a new framework for courts for determining whether a
rightful claim exists. The proposed framework will promote a
realistic symmetry between the buyer and seller and protect
companies from opportunistic patent trolls.
I. WARRANTY OF TITLE AND AGAINST INFRINGEMENT
A. The Warranty Against Infringement
The WAI is an implied warranty that “rides with” a contract for
a sale of goods under the UCC.21 In general, an implied warranty is
21. Section 2-312 of the UCC is entitled the “Warranty of Title and Against
Infringement; Buyer’s Obligation Against Infringement.” This section has three
subsections. The first subsection, the warranty of title, states: “(a) the title
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a guarantee that is read into the contract even though the contract
itself does not explicitly contain such a provision.22 The WAI is a
default term, meaning parties are free to contract around it. The
WAI states:
Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant
regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the
goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any
third person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer
who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the
seller harmless against any such claim which arises out of
compliance with the specifications.23
Unless specifically disclaimed, the WAI attaches to every sale
of goods regardless of the parties’ implicit understanding, and
guarantees that there is no “cloud” on the goods transferred in the
form of a potential third-party patent, trademark, or copyright
infringement suit.24 Unique to the WAI is that the guarantee runs
not only from seller to buyer, but also from buyer to seller.25 The
WAI requires the buyer to “hold the seller harmless” when it gives
design instructions to the seller.26 For example, if a lighting
company (buyer) gives detailed instructions to an insulation
manufacturer (seller) for a particular type of insulated part it needs,
and then a third party sues the manufacturer for patent
infringement based on these custom-designed parts, the lighting
company is responsible under the WAI to pay any costs the

conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and (b) the goods shall be
delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which
the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.” The second subsection
describes how parties may disclaim this section. The third subsection, the WAI,
is the focus of this Article.
22. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 297 n.9 (6th ed.
2012) (explaining that most states “impute[] a ‘warranty of fitness,’ which is a
guarantee that the court reads into the contract, even though the actual contract
did not explicitly contain such a guarantee.”).
23. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002).
24. While Official Comment 3 of § 2-312 (2002) only states that patent and
trademark infringement claims are covered here, courts have extended § 2-312 to
include copyright infringement claims as well. See e.g., Dolari Fabrics, Inc. v.
Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). (“The broad language . . .
applies to claim[s] of copyright infringement although the Official Comment
explicitly refers only to ‘claims of infringement of a patent or trademark by a third
party.’”). It is unclear whether other intellectual property rights, such as
misappropriation of trade secrets or violations of data privacy rights, may be
covered by § 2-312.
25. See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002).
26. Id.
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manufacturer incurs in defending itself against the third party.27
This has been coined the “customization exception.”28 For
purposes of clarity in this Article, the buyer is the default party
bringing the breach of WAI claim.29 This is the most common use
of the WAI.30
Although the WAI is a promise made by a seller that its goods
do not infringe a third party’s patent, trademark, or copyright, it is
not a promise insuring against any claim of infringement.31 Rather,
the WAI provides relief only for rightful third-party claims. To
establish a breach of the WAI, “a party must show the seller was a
merchant regularly dealing in the goods of the kind, the goods
were subject to a rightful infringement claim of any third party
upon delivery, the buyer did not furnish specifications to the seller,
and the parties did not form another agreement.”32
Courts began facing how to determine whether a third party
had made a rightful claim relatively recently.33 The statute itself
provides little guidance, so courts have turned to treatises,
scholarly articles, early cases involving the warranty of title, and
the traditional methods of statutory interpretation for direction.34
27. See Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1391–92 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
28. See e.g., Phoenix Solutions, Inc. v. Sony Elects. Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d
683, 698 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
29. Yet, as demonstrated with the lighting company and insulation
manufacturer, the burden may switch to the buyer anytime it gives
“specifications” to the seller.
30. See infra Part II for illustrative cases.
31. The UCC defines a merchant as a “person who deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or . . . who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.” § 2-104
(2011). This definition captures manufacturers, retailers, and wholesalers, even
with the extra layer requiring a merchant to be one that deals “regularly” with
the particular goods being sold. See McGowan, supra note 16, at 6.
32. Phoenix Solutions, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (emphasis added) (citing 84
Lumber Co. v. MRK Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d. 675, 687–79 (W.D. Pa.
2001)). The U.C.C only requires notification to the seller of a breach of the WAI
within a reasonable time if “the buyer is sued as a result of such a breach.”
U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(b) (2002) (emphasis added). Because of the high settlement
rates in patent litigation as well as the lack of incentives on buyers to not settle
quickly, both discussed infra, the seller is most often unlikely to have the
opportunity to ascertain the rightfulness of the claim and the reasonableness of
the settlement terms.
33. See Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1391–92 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
34. See Pac. Sunwear of Cal. Inc. v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d
182, 189-192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (using case law, treatises, law review articles,
and policy arguments as extrinsic aids used to properly define “rightful claim”).
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Thus, courts have fashioned varying standards for determining
what rightful entails, making it difficult for buyers and sellers to
anticipate the full effects of the WAI. The uncertainty over the
application of the WAI also undermines one of the main purposes
of the UCC—to create uniform standards for parties across the
nation.35
When faced with defining what constitutes a rightful claim
giving rise to a WAI action, courts initially recognized a need for a
comparison of the third party’s patented technology and the
allegedly infringing good.36 A court using this standard needs to
analyze the merit of the infringement claim in deciding whether it
was a rightful claim invoking WAI liability.37 Recently, courts
have broadened this standard. For example, a state court found a
rightful claim is any nonfrivolous claim that causes the buyer to
voluntarily give up use of the goods.38 Accordingly, a WAI claim
may be established by as little as a cease-and-desist letter.39
This recent standard for determining whether a rightful claim
has been made is troubling not only because patent trolls often
threaten litigation, but also because it demonstrates that courts are
unprepared to evaluate WAI claims in light of the relevant
underlying infringement claim. Parties accused of patent
infringement often want to continue using the allegedly infringing
goods. The patent holder and potentially infringing party most
often negotiate a price for continued use of the patented
technology.40 This negotiation results in a licensing settlement.41
This settlement is reached in a familiar pattern: a patent-holding
company sends a letter to a potential infringer proposing a
“discussion” of its patent portfolio and inviting it to participate in
its licensing program.42 Even if the buyer voluntarily gives up its
use of the goods or purchases a right to continue using the goods, it
is not using its own money. Instead, the buyer under the current
35. See generally Larry T. Garvin, Uncertainty and Error in the Law of
Sales: The Article Two Statute of Limitations, 83 B.U. L. REV. 345, 345–49
(2003) (highlighting the purpose of the UCC to promote certainty but noting that
it has provoked much litigation).
36. See 84 Lumber Co., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 680. For a more detailed
discussion, see infra Part IV.
37. 84 Lumber Co., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
38. Pacific Sunwear, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194. For a more detailed
discussion, see infra Part IV.
39. See Pacific Sunwear, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194.
40. Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic
Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160
(2008).
41. See id.
42. See id.

884

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

interpretation of rightful is in essence using the seller’s money.43
As soon as the buyer settles with the third party, it turns around
and holds the seller financially responsible under the WAI.
The potential damages under the WAI may include settlement
costs and traditional warranty damages, including losses occurring
“in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach . . . .”44 If
any incidental and consequential damages occur because of the
seller’s breach, the court may award those damages as well.45 If the
buyer does not settle and the third party wins at trial, the damage
award in the patent infringement suit will be added to the buyer’s
claim under the WAI.46
B. The First Problem: Big Money and Uncertainty
As illustrated above, the vast majority of patent infringement
suits do not make it to trial. The high costs of litigation, in which
discovery alone is estimated at $1.25 million for a case with $1
million-plus at stake, and the risk of an exorbitant judgment
motivates parties toward an early settlement.47 Most often this
settlement results in a licensing transaction, whereby the alleged
infringer essentially pays the patent holder for the right not to be
sued for infringement.48 These licensing transactions have been
43. An odd dichotomy is created here: The buyer argues to the third party
that it has not infringed, and then argues to the seller that it has likely infringed.
This type of two-hat approach is inherent in the WAI, and although perhaps
unsettling, courts have not appeared to be concerned.
44. U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (2002).
45. See U.C.C. § 2-714(3) (2002). The specific damages formula is “the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted,
unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.”
U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2002). Although there is some debate whether § 2-714, the
damages provision applied to warranties of quality breaches, should also apply
to warranties of title breaches, Professor Lord sees “no reason on principle why
a different rule should govern the measure of damages for a breach of the
warranty of title.” RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §66:54 (4th
ed. 2007). Professor Lord then states that the UCC provides no separate measure
of damages for the warranties of title and that we should accordingly conclude
that the general remedy is sufficient for all warranties. See id.
46. For example, if a patent infringement suit results in an infringement
verdict, these damages easily run in the millions. See PWC PATENT LITIGATION
STUDY, supra note 1, at 7.
47. Harkins, supra note 5, at 435 (listing average costs of discovery in 2005
as $350 thousand, $1.25 million, and $3 million for patent cases where $1
million, $1 million-plus, and $25 million-plus are at stake, respectively).
48. A license in the intellectual property context is often described as a “mere
covenant not to sue.” RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND OTHER INFORMATION ASSETS 12 (2d ed. 2007).
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such an enormous financial success for patent owners that a new
company structure has emerged—the “non-practicing entity”
(NPE).49 In less favorable terms, an aggressive NPE is known as a
“patent troll.”50 NPEs gather and administer patents that
individuals or companies assign to them.
These “fiendish figures”51 use their patent portfolios to wage a
licensing campaign against any possible infringer in the hopes that
these parties will simply get rid of the nuisance by buying a license
to “use” the patented technology.52 NPEs currently average
damage awards three times greater than practicing entities.53 The
reason may be simply that NPEs are less risk-averse than
practicing entities. If a practicing entity goes to trial and not only
loses its infringement case but also has its patent invalidated, the
result is devastating.54 The practicing entity, the one with a
personal investment in the patented technology, just lost its ability
to enforce the patent. The patent troll does not have this deterrent.
For the troll, a patent invalidation simply means the troll moves on
to enforcing another patent in its portfolio.55 Accordingly, a patent
troll is much more likely to “roll the dice and ‘game’ the patent
system in court.”56 Some say NPEs are choosing stronger patents
to litigate in certain jurisdictions with a reputation of producing big
damage awards.57
An example of an infamous NPE may be helpful to ground the
discussion. The late Jerome Lemelson has been called everything
from “the most prolific inventor of our time”58 and “an honest and
49. These entities are also sometimes more broadly referred to as “patentholding” entities or companies.
50. “Patent troll” was apparently coined after “patent extortionist” invoked
an action for libel. Golden, supra note 3, at 2112 n.7. Another account states the
term “patent troll” was first used by Peter Detkin of Intel Corporation to
describe small companies suing Intel for patent infringement for “nuisancevalue settlements.” Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme Court’s eBay
Decision Sets Back Pesky ‘Patent Trolls’ or American Innovation Depending
Upon Which Side You Are On, 92 A.B.A. J. 50, 51, 53 (2006).
51. Harkins, supra note 5, at 410–11 (drawing the imagery of Scandinavian
folklore of trolls who lived under bridges that they had not actually built yet still
prevented passersby from crossing if they did not pay a toll).
52. See id.
53. See PWC PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1, at 7–8.
54.Patents are commonly challenged on validity grounds under obviousness,
lack of enablement, and anticipation. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112.
55. See Harkins, supra note 5, at 443.
56. Id.
57. See PWC LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1, at 10.
58. Myrna Oliver, Jerome Lemelson; Inventor Held 500 Patents, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1997, available at http://www.inventionconvention.com/Americasinventor/
dec97issue/section16.html#Friday.
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courageous man”59 to “one of the great frauds of the 20th
century.”60 Lemelson and a team of attorneys, notably including
Gerald Hosier, pulled off the most significant “legalized
extortion,”61 collecting an estimated $1.5 billion dollars in
licensing fees for patents that were ultimately invalidated.62
In the 1950s, Lemelson filed patent applications for an early
“machine vision and bar code scanner.”63 One early patent
application was 150 pages and claimed a robot that could perform
tasks such as riveting, welding, transporting, and playing the role
of quality control inspector due to a built-in camera.64 This patent
application took nine years to get through the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), resulted in 16 new patents, and had
continuation applications tacked on throughout Lemelson’s
lifetime. Prior to 1995, a patent term was 17 years from the date of
issuance.65 This date of issuance was the key to Lemelson’s
licensing success. He would “file a ‘continuation in part’
application[,] which added additional drawings and text to the
applications, in order to extend the time.”66 Two specific
characteristics of many of Lemelson’s patents (numbering in the
hundreds) are noteworthy: They were “paper patents” as well as
“submarine patents.”
A paper patent describes an invention that the inventor has
never commercially used.67 Often, this signifies that the inventor is
a theorist and not a practitioner. Lemelson’s patents fit this
59. Don Costar, A Special Tribute to Jerome Lemelson, AMERICA’S
INVENTOR ONLINE EDITION, Dec. 1997, http://www.inventionconvention.com/
americasinventor/dec97issue/section16.html#Friday.
60. An Inventor’s Fight for Recognition — and Riches: Was Lemelson a
Great American Innovator or a Fraud? Debate Rages On, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 22, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9022361/ns/us_
news-life/ [hereinafter ASSOCIATED PRESS].
61. Mike Masnick, Lemelson's Legacy: Great Inventor Or Patent Hoarder?,
TECHDIRT (Aug. 22, 2005, 2:18 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20050822/
0217213.shtml.
62. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A patent term is now
twenty years.
66. The Symbol/Cognex-Lemelson Patent Battle, GROKLAW (Aug. 22, 2005,
11:05 AM), http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20050822040508297
[hereinafter Patent Battle].
67. See Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Inc., 260 F. Supp. 368, 374 (D. Del
1966) (describing a paper patent as one that has not been “commercially
exploited”); United Specialties Co. v. Industrial Wire Cloth Prods. Corp., 86 F.
Supp. 37, 39 (E.D. Mich. 1949) (describing a paper patent as that which has not
been put to “commercial use”).
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description. He had no lab or manufacturing plant—he never built
most of the technology that earned him his $1.5 billion empire. He
did not practice his patents. Although paper patents may be viewed
as the stepchildren of patents, the PTO requires only that an
applicant demonstrate conception and reduction to practice, and
reduction to practice requires no prototype or representation that
the applicant has actually used the invention.68 Rather, the required
reduction to practice may be constructive. So long as the patent’s
written description “enable[s] any person skilled in the art . . . to
make and use” the invention, it may pass muster.69
A submarine patent, no longer at issue because of the 1995
changes to patent law, was a patent that remained pending in the
PTO for years until, ultimately, the technology captured in the
patent comes into widespread commercial use.70 The pending
application would then be published, dated back to the time of
filing, and the patentee would have the power to collect heavy
royalties and licensing fees from all the companies that now use
this technology.71 Lemelson’s machine vision technology (bar code
scanner) was a submarine patent. He filed the patent application in
1956, and by the time the patent was finally approved in 1989
similar bar code technology was widely used by Japanese,
European, and American companies. Lemelson collected hundreds
of millions of dollars in licensing fees for his submarine patent.72
The Lemelson suits demonstrated an extreme licensing strategy
that many NPEs emulate today.73 Although this level of monetary
success may never be reached again due to the unique nature of
Lemelson’s submarine patents and the broad use of the technology
at issue, the strategy is still viable. Hosier, Lemelson’s main
attorney and strategist, focused his efforts on corporations with
68. In the United States, actual invention may be reduction to practice. U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINER PROCEDURE § 2138.04–.05 (8th ed., 2d rev. 2010)
[hereinafter MPEP]. Generally, the first inventor to conceive the invention and,
either actually or constructively, ultimately reduce it to practice is credited with
the earlier dated patent application. But see 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); MPEP §
2138.06 (requiring reasonable diligence on the part of the first conceiver (but
second reducer) from just prior to the first reducer’s entrance into the field to the
first conceiver’s reduction to practice for the first conceiver to be entitled to a
patent).
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1) (2006).
70. W. Samuel Niere & Robert E. Krebs, Prosecution Laches: Lemelson
Bar Code and Machine Vision Patents Held Unenforceable, INTELL. PROP. &
TRADE J., Spring 2004, at 12.
71. Id.
72. Patent Battle, supra note 66.
73. Oliver, supra note 58.
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deep pockets, the customers of the manufacturers, and had one
simple premise for getting them to pay: fear.74 As he stated, “‘This
business is not based on what’s right or what’s wrong . . . . It’s
based on fear. Nobody would pay you for a patent unless they
feared that the consequences of not paying you vastly exceed the
consequences of paying.’”75 These fear tactics were successful. No
company would take the risk of an infringement suit. Almost every
company chose to participate in the licensing program instead of
challenging the validity of Lemelson’s patents or infringement
claims.
Lemelson died in 1997 believing his patents were safe and
enforceable.76 After already receiving hundreds of millions of
dollars in licensing fees, Hosier and the Lemelson Medical,
Education & Research Foundation, LP (Lemelson Foundation)
continued the licensing campaign, suing more than 400 companies
in 1999.77 Again, his enforcement strategy was simple: Lemelson
sued any company that developed a product that one of his patents
may have covered in some way.78 Companies again started to buy
into the licensing program out of fear, even though people in the
industry recognized that the bar code scanner was likely not
enabled (meaning that the patent would likely be declared invalid
and unenforceable for failing to meet patentability requirements).79
Simply, an ordinary person skilled in the art could not read the
claims and written description and then build a bar code scanner—
at least one that would recognize “a bar code from a piece of tree
bark.”80
Cognex Corporation, a leading manufacturer of bar code
scanning systems, and Symbol Technologies, Inc., a leading
producer of bar code scanning devices, had a line of customers that
were demanding indemnification and damages, presumably

74. Patent Battle, supra note 66.
75. Id. Although this statement makes it hard to be compassionate for
Lemelson, he spent his life battling the big companies and fighting for what he
thought was his. He set up a not-for-profit organization to give back to his
community and to individual inventors like himself, and he gave generously. See
Costar, supra note 59.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Susan Hansen, Breaking the (Bar) Code, IP LAW & BUSINESS, March
2004, available at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/0a7ad1bd-23b84659-bfe5-a172b34a980d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2c66e5f3-c6564244-aa26-21bcdc3d93c2/Breaking_the_Bar_Code.pdf.
79. See id. For a thorough discussion of patent validity, see MERGES ET AL.,
infra note 211.
80. Hansen, supra note 78.
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through both individual contracts and the WAI.81 Because Cognex
and Symbol were never personally targeted, they filed a
declaratory judgment action against the Lemelson Foundation
challenging the machine vision and bar code patents on the
grounds of noninfringement, validity, and enforceability.82 Both
Cognex and Symbol “literally couldn’t afford to settle or lose.”83
In the end, a federal district court decided in favor of Cognex and
Symbol, ruling the asserted patents were invalid and
unenforceable, and that Cognex and Symbol did not infringe.84
Hosier had been defeated, but not before scores of companies
paid over $1.5 billion to “license” Lemelson’s technology—
technology based on patents that likely should have never been
valid or enforceable.85 The Lemelson suits show the value of
challenging dubious infringement assertions as well as the ability
of weak patents to withstand decades of threatened litigation. This
is precisely the type of company, the true user of the patented
technology, the framework proposed in this Article will encourage
to challenge weak patents.
Patent trolls and other aggressive patent holders will sue any
company that appears to be using the claimed technology. This
pattern of aggressive licensing campaigns is traditionally seen on
the federal level under the Patent Act as demonstrated by the
Lemelson suits. The problem is exacerbated by the increased use
of the WAI and the low threshold to establish a rightful claim.
Protected by the WAI, infringement defendants (buyers) have
stronger incentives to settle a claim than to defend themselves
against possibly frivolous suits. Because the WAI continues to be
used more frequently in commercial transactions and courts have
broadened the definition of rightful claim, patent trolls will
continue seizing the opportunity to target even more companies.
Accordingly, this sort of licensing campaign may spread to the
81. A notable example is 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK, Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp.
2d 675 (W.D. Pa. 2001), a case discussed in Part II.
82. Patent Battle, supra note 66.
83. Id.
84. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 301
F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1167 (D. Nev. 2004), aff’d, 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Specifically, the court found the patents “unenforceable under the equitable
doctrine of prosecution laches; that the asserted patent claims as construed by
the Court [were] not infringed by Symbol or Cognex because use of the accused
products [did] not satisfy one or more of the limitations of each and every
asserted claim; and that the claims [were] invalid for lack of written description
and enablement . . . .” Id.
85. Likely in response to criticism of the companies licensing weak patents,
Hosier stated, “These were eyes-open deals . . . . You pay your money and you
take your chances.” Hansen, supra note 78.
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state level. This is precisely why we should care whether a claim is
rightful.
C. The Second Problem: Buyer Playing with Seller’s Money
The problem of patent trolls sending hundreds of cease-anddesist letters and waiting for licensing royalties to roll in is
troubling because of the WAI’s currently low standard for what
constitutes a rightful claim entitled to protection. In order to
recover under the WAI, a buyer needs only to be threatened with
an infringement suit. The threat of litigation brings with it the risk
of suffering damages through the loss of the goods or a forced
payment to continue using the goods sold to it by a seller. Instead
of exposing its business to the substantial risk posed by protracted
litigation over the validity or potential infringement of a patent, the
buyer will settle with the threatening third party and proceed
directly against the seller to recover the licensing fees it pays
resulting from a settlement.
For the patent system to work as intended, a party is expected
to put forth maximum effort in determining a patent infringement
claim’s weaknesses. Parties responsible for paying their own
infringement damages or licensing fees will work to defend
themselves in court or at least to drive down potential licensing
fees. A company protected by the WAI lacks the incentives
necessary to defend itself against an infringement claim. A low
threshold for establishing that a third party has a rightful claim,
thereby entitling a party to WAI damages, worsens the problem.
Sellers forced to pay WAI claims believe, of course, that the
amount paid to appease the patentee is unreasonable.86 To prevent
patent trolls from adding unjustified costs to the productive
commercial use of technology, parties like Cognex and Symbol
need to take a stand and challenge the validity and enforceability
of the asserted patent(s). Only after the type of overreaching
demonstrated in the Lemelson suits, in which manufacturers must
either challenge or go out of business, are sellers willing to risk
patent litigation.

86. See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. G.I. Joe’s, Inc., No. CV05-764-HU, 2006 WL
2729555, at *5–6 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2006) (finding a genuine issue of fact existed
regarding whether the $25,000 settlement between buyer and third party was
unreasonable based on seller’s argument that the damages of an infringement
suit would likely have been $2,500 under the Lanham Act).
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II. CONTRASTING DEFINITIONS OF RIGHTFUL
Recall that the WAI states that “a merchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of
the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement . . . .”87
Importantly, there is no definition of rightful in the UCC and the
statutory language itself gives little insight as to how it should be
construed by the judiciary.88 That said, there are some clear
parameters. For starters, rightful does not mean “valid.”
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute originally proposed the
following language for when the WAI is triggered: “any rightful
claim of any third person by way of infringement or otherwise
unless the circumstances at the time of contracting place the risk of
such claim upon the buyer.”89 After the publication of this
definition, various bar groups were invited to offer testimony and
written memoranda on the proposed draft of the UCC. The New
York Patent Law Association (NYPLA) wanted the WAI to protect
against “valid claims.”90 The NYPLA argued for the term “valid”
to be used because it believed rightful was not only too ambiguous
but also that “patents, trademarks and copyrights are presumably
valid and therefore practically any colorable claim under them
could be a rightful claim.”91 The NYPLA further argued that a
standard of eviction, either actual or constructive, should be
adopted.92 Thus, a buyer would be required to prove “he or she had
been precluded from using the purchased goods as a prerequisite to
a warranty claim.”93
Despite strong support for the NYPLA’s proposed change, the
UCC drafters rejected the recommendation.94 Comment 4 to the
WAI states that the case law requiring eviction is not adopted and,
moreover, that “‘eviction’ is not a necessary condition to the
buyer’s remedy since the buyer’s remedy arises immediately upon
receipt of notice of infringement . . . .”95 After the defeat of the

87. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002) (emphasis added).
88. William F. Dundine, Jr., Warranties Against Infringement Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 36 N.Y. ST. B.J. 214, 214 (1964).
89. Id. at 217.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182,
188 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
94. Dundine, supra note 88, at 218.
95. U.C.C. § 2-312 cmt. 4 (2002).
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proposed “valid claim” language, many questions remain
unanswered for NYPLA supporters, such as:
Must the claim be one which is ultimately vindicated by a
judgment of validity and infringement, or need it only be
one which reasonable men would agree is rightful? Would
it include a colorable claim which reasonable businessmen
would settle rather than fight? Whose responsibility is it
and what are the criteria to test whether the claim is
“rightful”?96
The judiciary continues struggling to answer these questions,
and despite the expressed desire for “national uniformity in the
area of commercial law,”97 the answers vary from one jurisdiction
to another.
A. The Early Definitions Created by Federal Courts
Although earlier courts applied the WAI, there was practically
no discussion of what constituted a rightful clam before the 1996
Federal Circuit case Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Corporation.98
The plaintiff–patentee Cover sued Sea Gull for direct infringement
and Hydramatic for contributory infringement based on U.S. Patent
No. 4,605,992 (‘992 patent).99 The ‘992 patent’s claims describe “a
lighting fixture system having a batt [fabric] of thermal insulation
to protect the wiring from heat produced by a bulb.”100 Hydramatic
was an insulation products manufacturer that built its products to
its customers’ specifications.101 Sea Gull, a lighting fixture
manufacturer, hired Hydramatic to create specific insulation parts
96. Dundine, supra note 88, at 219.
97. See Pure Country Weavers, Inc. v. Bristar, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 439,
447 (W.D.N.C. 2006).
98. Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Corp., 83 F.3d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
99. Direct infringement occurs when anyone “makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2006) (including “import[ing] into the United States any patented invention”
within the class of acts that constitute direct infringement). Direct infringement
of a patented invention is a necessary condition for the imposition of
contributory infringement. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 784 (2010). Additionally,
contributory infringement requires an “offer[] to sell . . . within the United States
. . . a component of a patented invention . . . or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process” when the offering or selling person knows that
such component or apparatus is “especially made or especially adapted for use
in an infringement of such patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). Specifically
exempted from this class of components or apparatuses are “staple” goods
which are “suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Id.
100. Cover, 83 F.3d at 1391.
101. Id.
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for its light fixtures. Hydramatic purchased these parts from Pacor,
the exclusive licensee of Cover’s ‘992 patent.102 Hydramatic
settled with third-party patentee Cover for $175,000103 and then
filed a cross-claim against Sea Gull seeking to recover that
settlement amount under the WAI.104 Sea Gull settled with Cover,
but Hydramatic’s cross-claim went to trial.105
Although the Federal Circuit did not ultimately need to define
rightful claim,106 it did find that there does not need to be an
absolute finding of patent infringement for a rightful claim to
exist.107 The Federal Circuit reasoned that to require such a high
burden would “eschew settlement and . . . force[] [parties] to go to
trial to discern whether a ‘rightful claim’ exists under federal
patent law.”108
In 2001 a Pennsylvania district court looked more closely at
what a rightful claim might be in 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK
Technologies, Ltd.109 Plaintiff 84 Lumber purchased hand-held
laser devices to use in its bar code scanning system from
defendants.110 Shortly after making this purchase from defendants,
84 Lumber found itself among 400 companies sued by Hosier and
the Lemelson Foundation (together, “Lemelson”) for infringing the
bar code scanning patent.111 Next, 84 Lumber settled with
Lemelson for $40,000 and then sued the defendant manufacturers
in state court for breach of the WAI.112 Defendants filed a timely
removal to the federal district court, and the court ordered briefs
and heard argument on whether the litigation was in the correct
forum.113 In these briefs and oral arguments, a dispute between the
parties arose regarding the definition of rightful claim.

102. Id. at 1391–92.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1392.
106. This case involved a preemption issue, namely whether the marking
statute, 35 U.S.C. 287(a), preempted the WAI. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 287(a)
(2010) (stating that a patentee’s or licensee’s “failure to . . . mark” the patented
article in accordance with the statutory requirements precludes damages “except
on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter”).
107. Cover, 83 F.3d at 1394.
108. Id.
109. 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675 (W.D. Pa.
2001).
110. Id. at 676.
111. Id. at 676–77.
112. Id. at 677.
113. Id.
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Plaintiff 84 Lumber argued that a rightful claim does not
require a determination of actual liability to the third party, rather,
that a reasonable belief that the third party would be successful in
its action is sufficient.114 The defendants argued that a rightful
claim is “a just or legally established claim,” and, therefore, 84
Lumber did not have a valid breach of warranty claim.115 The
district court determined that “[i]f claims of patent infringement
are seen as marks on a continuum, whatever a ‘rightful claim’ is
would fall somewhere between purely frivolous claims, at one end,
and claims where liability has been proven, at the other.”116 Thus,
the district court disagreed with the plaintiff’s reasonable-belief
definition, reasoning that this personal belief is really a “subjective
belief and representation” that the third party would likely win.117
Subjective belief and representation is insufficient to impose
liability on the defendants, yet the court also disagreed with the
defendants’ argument that the claim must be “legally
established.”118
Overall, the 84 Lumber court found that the determination of
whether a third party made a rightful claim, entitling the accused
infringer to recover any losses under the WAI, should be addressed
by “comparing the scope of the patents at issue with the allegedly
infringing products.”119 Although the federal court offered no
guidance on how to make this comparison, it did recognize the
need for a patent-specific analysis. It lit the path for future courts
faced with delimiting rightful, yet state courts have failed to follow
it. Instead, state courts have set a new standard in the opposite
direction. They perform little, if any, analysis comparing the
asserted patent with the allegedly infringing good before
determining whether the third-party infringement claim is rightful
and deserving of WAI protection.
B. The Recent Definitions Created by State Courts
In 2007, a New Jersey court was the first state court to be faced
with determining the boundaries of a rightful claim under the
WAI.120 The Sun Coast Merchandise Corp. v. Myron Corp.
114. Id. at 679.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 680.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 922 A.2d 782 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2007). The WAI had arisen in other cases, yet the definition of
rightful was not at issue.
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opinion commences the quick departure from the patent-specific
analysis adopted in 84 Lumber. The dispute in Sun Coast began
when the third-party patentee sued the seller manufacturer (Sun
Coast) for patent infringement of a flip-top calculator.121 Because
of the patent infringement suit against Sun Coast, Myron, the
buyer, refused to pay for the calculators and other products ordered
and received from Sun Coast.122 Myron withheld payment because
it was concerned that the patentee would sue Myron for
infringement for its use of Sun Coast’s calculators.123 Further, Sun
Coast allegedly implied that it had a licensing agreement with the
patentee that would allow Myron to use the technology if it
contributed a per-item royalty fee.124 In fact, no such royalty fee
arrangement between Sun Coast and the patentee existed. So, when
Sun Coast sued Myron for a contractual breach, Myron counterclaimed for a WAI breach because, it claimed, Sun Coast could not
deliver the product free from a rightful claim for infringement.125
The court began its discussion by noting the difficulty in
determining when a third-party claim develops into a WAI
action.126 It then highlighted that the WAI’s statutory language
protects only rightful claims.127 New Jersey state courts had not
faced this issue before, and so the Sun Coast court looked to an
earlier New Jersey opinion that had determined the warranty of
title’s scope.128 This earlier case involved an allegedly stolen
truck.129 There, the court found that a “mere casting of a
substantial shadow” over the title of the truck was sufficient to
show a breach of the warranty of good title.130 The Sun Coast court
adopted this substantial standard, finding it appropriately suited for
the WAI’s rightful claim requirement.131 Consistent with prior
analyses, the court stated that a showing of validity and patent
infringement is unnecessary—“only that [the patentee’s] claim had

121. See Sun Coast, 922 A.2d at 786.
122. See id. at 790.
123. Id. at 786. In fact, the patentee informed Myron to “be careful” because
it would be “suing all those who violated its patent.” Id.
124. See id.
125. See id. There were other claims involved, such as negligent
misrepresentation and fraud, but none that are important to this Article.
126. Id. at 795.
127. Id.
128. The warranty of title is like the WAI in that there is strict liability for
any “cloud” on the title. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
129. Sun Coast, 922 A.2d at 795.
130. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting American Container Corp. v. Hanley
Trucking Corp., 268 A.2d 313, 331 (N.J. Ch. 1970)).
131. Id.
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sufficient substance to unduly disturb [defendant’s] ownership and
disposition of the goods in question.”132
The Sun Coast court cited 84 Lumber in its discussion of the
rightful claim issue, ultimately defining a rightful claim as one “of
a substantial nature that is reasonably likely to subject the buyer to
litigation, and has a significant and adverse effect on the buyer’s
ability to make use of the goods in question.”133 Implicit in this
definition is that no actual litigation is necessary for a party to
invoke the WAI’s protection. The patentee never sued Myron. Sun
Coast’s definition excludes the patent-specific language used in 84
Lumber—“comparing the scope of the patents at issue with the
allegedly infringing products”134although, in determining whether
the third-party claim will likely expose a buyer to litigation, a court
must address the claim’s merit. This departure from the patentspecific language led later courts to stray further from the path set
by 84 Lumber.
Shortly after the Sun Coast opinion, a California state court
found that the standard set in Sun Coast was unclear and that a
substantial claim was more than the WAI required.135 In Pacific
Sunwear of California, Inc. v. Olaes Enterprises, Inc., the
California court found that “‘substantial nature’ should be
understood to mean a nonfrivolous claim.”136 Only claims “devoid
of merit” are excluded.”137 The court also clarified that in
California, at least, actual litigation is unnecessary. The mere
possibility of litigation may be sufficient.138 Under this broader
132. Id. at 797.
133. Id.
134. 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
135. Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182,
194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
136. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Sun Coast, 922 A.2d at 797). The Pacific
Sunwear court also explained that it chose “nonfrivolous” over Sun Coast’s
“substantial nature” test because “‘nonfrivolous’ is a term that can be readily
applied to the evaluation of legal claims and is thus more conducive to concrete
application.” Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(2) (defining
“‘frivolous’ in the context of attorney or party sanctions to mean, inter alia,
‘totally and completely without merit’”)). This case involved a trademark
dispute; a later federal district court in California stated that there is no reason to
construe the WAI differently for a trademark than a patent case. See Phoenix
Solutions, Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 683, 697 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
137. Pacific Sunwear, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 193 (finding “the warranty against
rightful claims applies to all claims of infringement that have any significant and
adverse effect on the buyer’s ability to make use of the purchased goods,
excepting only frivolous claims that are completely devoid of merit”).
138. See id. at 194 (“[T]he existence of litigation is neither necessary nor, in
itself, sufficient to establish that a claim is ‘rightful.’ A claim of infringement
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interpretation of rightful, a buyer can maintain a WAI claim even if
it voluntarily stops using its goods and gives up ownership of its
goods upon receiving a patent holder’s threat of an infringement
suit.139 Although the court only gives an example of a buyer who
decides to stop using the goods, this standard presumably includes
a buyer’s decision to pay a licensing fee to settle the potential
infringement suit.140 Because a patent is presumed valid,141 a
nonfrivolous standard means little. As demonstrated by the
Lemelson suits, targeting a company that has developed a product
that “in some way [might] resemble” the patented technology is
not frivolous or sanctionable.142
A California federal district court recently adopted this low
threshold standard of rightful claim in Phoenix Solutions, Inc. v.
Sony Electronics, Inc.143 There the court held that Sony had met its
burden of showing a rightful claim was made against it because the
third-party infringement claim had a “significant and adverse effect
on Sony’s ability to make use of [the goods].”144 Overall, state
courts have curtailed the early standard for determining whether a
third party asserted a rightful claim—one that required a
comparison of the allegedly infringing goods to the patent claims’
scope. Under the more recent standard, courts hardly analyze the
third-party patent holder’s infringement claim. Instead, courts
focus on whether the threat of litigation had an adverse effect on
the buyer’s use of the purchased goods (e.g., purchase of a
license). This is the type of “subjective” belief that 84 Lumber
found insufficient. Under the current regime, patent trolls are free
to continue their aggressive behavior, and buyers can respond with
others’ money. The potential for abuse should not cause lawmakers
or courts to discard the WAI entirely. Instead, potential for abuse

may be rightful under section 2312(3) whether or not it is ultimately pursued in
litigation.”).
139. Id.
140. See generally Golden, supra note 3, at 2124 (stating the “overwhelming
majority of patent disputes are resolved out of court”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 4, at 1992 (finding many patent disputes are resolved by licensing
arrangements instead of litigation).
141. See 35 U.S.C § 282 (2006) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
142. Hansen, supra note 78.
143. Phoenix Solutions, Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 683 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
144. Id. at 697. In adopting the Pacific Sunwear court’s definition, the
California district court noted that it did not matter whether the underlying thirdparty claim is a trademark claim, as was the case in Pacific Sunwear. See id.
“[T]here is no reason to construe section 2312(3) of the California [Commercial]
Code any differently for patent cases.” Id.
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should spark motivation to look at the theoretical underpinnings of
warranty law, examine why the UCC shifts liability to the seller
under the WAI, and determine if these justifications are still
applicable in today’s technologically-driven economy.
III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF WARRANTY LAW
Calls for patent reform have included arguments that “patent
damages are not properly tied to economic function of patents.”145
Similarly, the incentives for parties arising from the WAI’s current
enforcement are not “properly tied” to the WAI’s intended purpose
and economic function. This problem may be linked in part to the
low threshold for determining a rightful claim. Yet, the problem is
caused by a deeper, more fundamental problem with the WAI. The
theoretical justifications of warranty law do not distinguish the
WAI from other warranties despite its unique focus on intellectual
property. This approach creates an unrealistic and over-generalized
response to the unique demands of the intellectual property
infringement claims invoking WAI protection.
A. Theories of Warranty Law
Contracts involve risks, and warranties are risk-allocating
devices. Warranty law attempts to provide uniform and predictable
mechanisms by assigning risk to one party to the underlying
contract.146 The WAI’s purpose is seemingly straightforward:
create a default rule that places the risk of infringement on the
party in the best position to manage it. This approach protects the
buyer’s good-faith expectations,147 because the buyer is generally
viewed as the party with the least information and least ability to
assess risk. A party expects to purchase goods, not a lawsuit.
Under the WAI, where a merchant is one that regularly deals in
the goods sold, this risk allocation may seem reasonable. Some
scholars opine that the burden of anticipating and defending
145. Opderbeck, supra note 1, at 187 (stating that patent reformers are
correct in their “intuition” that patent damages and the economic function of
patents are at odds). Recall that the WAI may also run from the buyer to seller if
the buyer gives the seller design specifications for the goods it wants
manufactured. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002).
146. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL 317 (2d ed. 2009).
147. See Pure Country Weavers, Inc. v. Bristar, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 439,
449 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (describing warranty of title as “regulat[ing] the
relationship between buyers and sellers . . . in order to protect the good-faith
expectations of buyers”).

2012]

WARRANTING RIGHTFUL CLAIMS

899

infringement claims is most judiciously born by the seller who
generally has superior knowledge as to the potential existence of
any such claims. In this instance, the WAI works to create a
stronger incentive for the seller to put in effort to discover and
prevent any potential infringement claims prior to sale.148 The
WAI is premised, therefore, in substantial part on theories of
asymmetric information.
Theories of asymmetric or imperfect information posit that
sellers, because of their position in the market as repeat players
with ownership and oversight of the goods involved, will have
more information than buyers about the quality or title of the
goods.149 Literature on economic informational asymmetries
explains that market failure may occur when there “is an imbalance
of information between parties to an exchange, one so severe that
an exchange is impeded.”150 These asymmetries can be corrected
by actions in the law against those that fail to disclose certain
information or misrepresent information.151 In cases where there is
a concern about a party’s willingness to give up its superior
bargaining power, the government may step in and mandate certain
disclosures.152
These informational imperfections or asymmetries may also be
corrected by warranties. Under warranty law there is no mandatory
disclosure. Instead, certain implicit guarantees are given; namely,
that the goods sold will either perform the ordinary intended use of
those goods153 or a use for a particular purpose that is specifically
expressed.154 Another implicit guarantee is that the party selling
the goods has full rights and title to the goods and that no third
party will claim otherwise.155 The purpose of these implied
warranties is to place an incentive to disclose important
information on the party who is in the best position to know the
quality and title of the goods.156 This disclosure of information
helps to avoid, insure, or at least minimize risks of loss and the
harm caused by the sale of goods.157
148. Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. Olaes Enter., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182,
190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
149. GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 146, at 317.
150. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 46.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 46–47. An example of a mandatory disclosure is when a party
sells a home and must disclose any termite infestation. Id.
153. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002).
154. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (2002).
155. See U.C.C. § 2-312 (2002).
156. GILLETE & WALT, supra note 146, at 358–59.
157. Id. at 359.
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Avoiding harms and insuring against the risk of loss also
justifies the use of strict liability to enforce warranty law. Although
the buyer must prove a causal relationship between the warranty
breach and injury suffered,158 holding a party strictly liable for
breach of a warranty is defended on the grounds that “the seller, as
an enterprise, is in the best position to bear and distribute losses
through market insurance, self-insurance, or pricing.”159 Whether
the seller tried its best to manufacture quality goods or sell a car
with clean title is irrelevant. If the seller fails to meet the standards
of the implied warranty of merchantability or warranty of title, it
will be liable for its breach.160 Good faith is not a defense161
because strict liability theories of warranty law are not premised on
culpability, but rather comparative advantage.162 Strict liability
“allocates losses to merchant sellers not because they are
wrongdoers, but because they have a comparative advantage as
against their buyers at reducing or insuring against a risk of
nonconformity in the goods sold.”163 This allocation of risk places
the incentive on the party in the best position to produce the most
efficient result.164
Representational theories likewise focus on problems of
asymmetrical information between parties.165 For example, under
the implied warranty of merchantability, “the goods are, at the very
least, described in the agreement and sold at some price in a
158. Id. This causal relationship is implicit in § 2-714(2)’s measure of
buyer’s damages for breach. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2002) (measuring buyer’s
damages as “the difference at . . . acceptance between the value of the goods
accepted and the value [the goods] would have had if they had been as
warranted . . .”).
159. Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity
Requirement: Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 21 (1987).
160. And, remember, although the party with the most information is usually
the seller, the WAI contemplates that the buyer may be in the superior position
when it gives the seller designs and specifications to create its own custom
goods.
161. “Good faith is not a defense to a claim for breach of the warranty of
title, nor is the seller’s lack of knowledge of the title defect.” LORD, WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS, supra note 45, § 52:65.
162. GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 146, at 317.
163. Id.
164. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 3–4. Efficiency can generally be
defined as fulfilling the condition that “it is not possible to produce the same
amount of output using a lower-cost combination of inputs . . . .” Id. at 17.
Specific to the warranty context, efficiency mandates placing the costs of
breaching the WAI on the party most capable of reducing the risk and severity
of infringement (here, the reduction of risk and severity of liability can be seen
as the output) at the lowest cost.
165. See Speidel, supra note 159, at 14.
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context where the relevant community’s expectations of ordinary
use can be determined.”166 The implied warranty of
merchantability “has a strong representational component,” and no
proof of reliance on the representation is needed due to the implied
nature of the promise.167 Similarly, the WAI has a representational
component based on reasonable interpretations of sales contracts.
Simply, if a widget is purchased, the seller is implicitly
representing it owns the widget. The seller is representing in the
sale to its buyer that no other party has rights to or in the widget.
Whether couched as economic, strict liability, or
representational theories, warranty law is commonly understood as
a risk-allocation device.168 Warranty law places the risk of loss on
the parties who are in the best position to avoid or at least
minimize the risk.169 Although this structure generally makes
sense, when applied to the specialized field of intellectual property,
it fails to provide the same justifications upon which much of
warranty law is based.
B. The Breakdown
Because the WAI gets lumped together in the literature with
warranties of quality and title, it is likewise defended on notions of
informational asymmetries. So like warranties of quality, the WAI
is seen as a tool to induce parties to act in a certain way. In
particular, the WAI places the burden on the seller to take action to
avoid potential loss or increased costs due to third-party
infringement suits.170 Yet the WAI is often applied “to situations
where it is sheer imagination to presume that the seller has
knowledge of his title superior to that of the buyer.”171 In those
situations, the problem of asymmetrical information between
parties is greatly reduced.
166. Specific to the warranty context, efficiency mandates placing the costs
of breaching the WAI on the party most capable of reducing the risk and
severity of infringement (here, the reduction of risk and severity of liability can
be seen as the output) at the lowest cost.
167. Id.
168. GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 146, at 317.
169. See id.
170. Recall that the current standard of the WAI requires a buyer to have a
“rightful claim” against it by a third party before it has the ability to claim
damages from the seller. Likewise, the WAI imposes a duty on buyers to hold
sellers harmless when the buyer provides the specifications for the goods to be
manufactured, and the third party has a “rightful claim” against the seller. See
U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2002).
171. Dundine, supra note 88, at 215.
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For example, assume Dr. Smith obtains a process patent for
growing a crystal semiconductor that is used to produce blue light
emitting diodes (LEDs). This patented technology is widely used
in consumer electronic products, most notably Blu-ray players. Dr.
Smith is a theorist and does not manufacture or sell any products
that use his patented technology. Before Dr. Smith’s patent
expires, he launches a cease-and-desist licensing campaign
targeting all major producers of consumer electronics. Dr. Smith
believes he put in significant time and effort in discovering this
crystal-growing process first and wants others who use the same
process or a substantially similar process to pay him royalties.172
Dr. Smith’s attorney sends letters to all the major Blu-ray
technology users, such as Sanyo, Mitsubishi, Motorola, and Sony.
None of these buyers have ever heard of Dr. Smith or his patent
because Dr. Smith is a unnoticed theorist who does not attend
industry trade conferences or have relationships with any of the big
technology companies. Even though these companies may doubt
the patent’s validity or the merit of Dr. Smith’s infringement claim,
they all succumb and participate in the licensing program. Simply,
the risk of stalling an entire line of production, recalling products,
and losing market position is too much. Within just a few years of
building his license portfolio, Dr. Smith obtains over $30 million
dollars for a dubious patent.
Upon reaching a license-based settlement, the buyers that
purchased the crystal semiconductors allegedly created using Dr.
Smith’s patented process have a WAI action against their supply
manufacturers.173 Because the buyers all received a threat of
litigation and were adversely affected when they paid into Dr.
Smith’s licensing program, under current interpretations of
rightful, they will have a WAI claim against the manufacturers.
These manufacturers have likewise never heard of Dr. Smith or his
patented process and, moreover, insist they have been using the
same or the substantially similar crystal-growing process years
before Dr. Smith received his patent. There is no informational
asymmetry problem here, and yet, the WAI is supposed to correct
assumed asymmetries by placing an incentive on the seller to avoid
these patent infringement suits.

172. The same-or-substantially-different language is from the doctrine of
equivalents, which “allows the patentees to claim those insubstantial alterations
that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be
created through trivial changes.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
173. This assumes the parties did not contract around the WAI.
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The manufacturers in this situation must bear the entire burden
of aggressive patent trolls like Dr. Smith. Further, these
manufacturers are often given no meaningful opportunity to
participate in the settlement process between the third-party
patentee and the buyer. Even though a buyer must give notice to its
seller, it is only obligated to do so when a third party sues.174 In
many instances the buyer is never sued, just threatened with suit.
Further, the manufacturer may never have an opportunity to be
involved in the settlement process because of other reasons. For
example, in the semiconductor and software industries, companies
often “aggregate hundreds or thousands of different components to
make an integrated product.”175 Further complicating matters,
these different components are often patented by many different
inventors.176 How does Sony know which seller is responsible for
an allegedly infringing component? Conversely, how does a seller
know if it is his component that caused the threat of litigation?
With a more rigorous definition of the WAI, both buyer and seller
would carry the burden of gathering information and paying
aggressive patent trolls. The buyer would have an incentive to
evaluate the merits of the infringement claim before quickly
agreeing to participate in a licensing program. The seller would
have an incentive to support its buyers and help decide whether the
infringement allegation has merit in the face of potential WAI
liability.
These licensing campaigns that threaten costly infringement
suits are a daily struggle for many corporate legal departments.177
Patent law is vulnerable to this problem for several reasons, with
the most noteworthy reason that patent law is a strict liability
tort.178 “Patent infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that
a defendant may be liable without having had any notice, prior to
the filing of an infringement action, that her conduct was
infringing.”179 Unlike copyright law, which grants a defense based
on independent discovery,180 patent law provides no good-faith
174. See § U.C.C. 2-607 (2002) (requiring notification to the seller of a
breach of the WAI within a reasonable time if “the buyer is sued as a result of
such a breach”) (emphasis added).
175. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19
(2008) (stating also that in the past 20 years, more than 2.5 million U.S. patents
have been issued).
176. Id. at 19–20.
177. See Sudarshan, supra note 40, at 160 (stating that “nuisance-value
patent suits are a daily fact of life for most corporate legal departments”).
178. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
179. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives
in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800 (2002).
180. Id. at 801 n.7.
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defense to an infringement claim.181 Thus, defendants have no
defense based on unintentional or inadvertent infringement.182
Most troubling here is that parties like Lemelson and Dr. Smith
are garnering exorbitant licensing fees on infringement claims that
are dubious at best. Correcting informational asymmetries between
the parties, a main purpose of warranty law as applied generally to
the WAI, is not always a realistic response given the factual
circumstances. Sellers in many instances have no more information
about potential infringement suits than their buyers, and so they
possess no greater information than buyers that would enable them
to avoid or minimize risk.183 With over 2.5 million U.S. patents
issued in the last 20 years and numerous patents covering
extremely similar technology, it is unrealistic to have this
expectation of sellers.184
The unifying theoretical thread of warranty law does not
properly apply to the WAI. As a consequence of the misfit, patent
trolls like Lemelson and Dr. Smith are not discouraged from
engaging in overly aggressive and opportunistic behavior. With the
low threshold for determining what a rightful claim is under the
WAI, patent trolls can send targeted letters to buyers, counting on
them to fear a costly patent infringement suit and therefore to
decide to participate in licensing programs.185 Patent trolls
understand that buyers like Sony are more likely than
manufacturers to enter license-based settlements because of their
higher financial risk. The tendency to settle is bolstered by the fact
that buyers are not as familiar as manufactures are with the
intricacies of the numerous components that comprise their
products.
My proposed framework for determining when a third party
makes a rightful claim, thereby triggering protection for the
accused buyer under the WAI, will help states decrease current and
future problems with the WAI. If buyers are encouraged to take a
closer look at the infringement claim asserted by opportunistic
patent holders in the cease-and-desist letters and to actively seek
the involvement of the potential manufacturers and responsible
parties for a breach of the WAI, patent trolls would be forced to
support and defend their massive licensing campaigns. The
resulting incentive for buyers to require a more rigorous
181. Id. at 800–01.
182. Id.
183. Of course, this is not always the case, and when it is not, the same
concern about holding the seller responsible for something it could not have
prevented any better than the buyer does not exist.
184. See Lemley, supra note 175, at 19.
185. Sudarshan, supra note 40, at 160.
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determination of the third-party claim will help spread the burdens
of the liability-shifting WAI on both the seller and buyer, force
buyers to internalize more of the ultimate costs of settlement, and
deter patent trolls from targeting more buyers.
IV. A “UNIFORM” FRAMEWORK
Parties overwhelmingly resolve patent disputes out of court.186
Because licensing terms are “negotiated in the shadow of
litigation,”187 we must analyze how patent law and commercial law
affect parties when they are bargaining for the terms of their
settlements. The interaction between patent law and commercial
law is a relatively new issue. Federal courts have encountered
aggressive and litigious behavior from patent holders for years, yet
state courts have been shielded from the demands and intricacies of
patents because of the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over
patent law.188 Although this exclusivity means state courts will
never decide patent infringement suits, state courts will sort out the
resulting WAI disputes between buyer and seller. As scholars have
noted, there is an increasing awareness of intellectual property
implications in commercial transactions.189 There is also now a
recognition in practice that the WAI may function as a mechanism
to recover losses for clients.190 For the first time, the door is
opening on the state level to the leftovers of aggressive patent troll
behavior, and the sometimes-mismatched information between the
buyer and seller further complicates the use of the WAI.
The easy solution here may seem to simply have the buyer and
seller contract around the WAI. Although this solution may seem
straightforward, it will work only if both parties agree to the
186. Golden, supra note 3, at 2124.
187. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1992 (“[S]ince far more patents are
licensed or settled than litigated to judgment, the primary economic effect of
rules governing patent litigation arises through the effect of those rules on the
licensing terms that are negotiated in the shadow of litigation.”).
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006) (vesting the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from a district court “if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this
title”). Section 1338, in turn, vests exclusive original jurisdiction with the
district courts “of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
189. Scholars noted an increase in the amount of commercial transactions
involving intellectual property in the mid-1990s. See PETER A. ALCES &
HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY xxix,
(1994); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1572 (1994).
190. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 16, at 6.
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explicit removal of the WAI in their transaction. In many
instances, this may be impossible. The buyer often has more
bargaining power than the seller due to its deep pockets; therefore,
it may be able to demand that the WAI apply to the transaction.
Accordingly, this solution is not only unrealistic in many
transactions, but it may also be undesirable because it can result in
a nervous buyer demanding a more secure WAI-type provision
from sellers.191 This negotiation around the default rule will also
increase transaction costs. Parties will need to separately draft their
own WAI, or otherwise draft a no-WAI provision. In this sense,
implied warranties are beneficial because they avoid extra
transaction costs and also instill some level of uniformity and
expectation management for parties across the nation.
This Article proposes a better solution than striking the WAI
from every sales contract. Instead, courts should adopt a new
framework for determining what constitutes a rightful claim.
Because courts are altering this structure with almost every case,
this new framework is both a practical and implementable solution
to a problem that is only going to get bigger with time. Put simply,
a rightful claim should be one that has a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits. This means that a third party must have a
claim against a buyer that will, or would if it went to trial, be
reasonably expected to succeed on the merits at trial before the
buyer is entitled to damages under the WAI from the seller.192 This
is similar to courts’ initial interpretations of rightful, but this
Article also offers a structured analysis for making this
determination.193 The analysis for determining the reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits of the third-party’s claim must
be tailored to the specific intellectual-property-infringement claim
asserted: patent, trademark, or copyright.
Courts have been conducting this type of tailored analysis for
decades regarding preliminary injunction motions in civil
litigation. State courts should look to how federal courts conduct
these intellectual-property-specific analyses when they examine
the first factor parties must demonstrate for a preliminary
injunction: likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, when
a buyer brings a breach of a WAI action because of a third-partypatentee infringement claim against it, the state court should mimic
191. See, e.g., Chere Amie, Inc. v. Windstar Apparel, Inc., 01 Civ. 0040
(WHP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15261, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Kohl’s had
Windstar agree to an “any claim” indemnification provision, eventually costing
Windstar $2,216,554 in attorney’s fees and recall costs).
192. Of course, the parties will be switched if the buyer gives specifications
to the seller for custom-made goods.
193. See supra Part II.A.
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how federal courts handle the first factor of a preliminaryinjunction motion for a patent infringement suit. This analysis
focuses on the meaning and scope of the claims of the asserted
patents.194 It involves claim construction, although notably at an
early stage in a patent infringement suit. After interpreting the
claims of the patent, at least on a preliminary level, courts use this
interpretation and compare it to the allegedly infringing good that
the seller sold to the buyer.195 Further, and consistent with
transactions under the UCC, all settlement agreements must be
entered into with good faith. This is of particular importance when
liability is easily established and the buyer has little to no
bargaining power. Good faith should be analyzed by looking at the
process a party uses to decide how much it is willing to pay for a
right not to be sued by the third-party patentee.
One exception exists to this proposed structure when a
presumption of a rightful claim should inure to the buyer. Claims
that receive this presumption are ones where the realistic value of
the infringement suit is so high that the risk of going to trial leads
the reasonable businessman to settle despite potential weaknesses
in the infringement claim. These claims must also involve highly
sophisticated technology to fit into this exception. Although this
Article does not specifically delineate what is and what is not
highly sophisticated technology or what balance of money and
sophistication is needed because of the unique aspects in each
situation, in many instances in practice this may be a relatively
easy determination.. Technology , for example, that involves
introducing particular combinations of dopants with chemical
elements in vats at extreme temperatures in order to grow layers of
semiconductor crystals,196 is much more sophisticated and highrisk in terms of dollar values than the technology and presumably
money involved in flip top calculators or sheets of insulation.197
Noteworthy here is that he settlement amount still must be
analyzed with a standard of good faith that focuses on the process
taken in reaching the terms of the settlement—i.e., the amount paid
to obtain a license.
The following subparts discuss the preliminary-injunction
motion’s underpinnings and the type of analysis a federal court
194. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
195. See id. at 1358–61.
196. See Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 173, 176–79 (D. Mass.
2010).
197. See Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 922 A.2d 782, 785–87
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); Cover v. Hydramatic Parking Co., 86 F.3d
1390, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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performs when deciding patent infringement claims. There is also a
short discussion on both WAI infringement claims involving
trademarks and copyrights because these analyses vary from that
of patent infringement claims. Although the troubling issue of
aggressive NPEs does not often arise with trademarks or
copyrights, the issue of a buyer “playing” with a seller’s money
does. This Article will then illustrate how these intellectualproperty-tailored analyses will provide relief for the aggrieved
buyer and also encourage it to be diligent and thorough with the
settlement process. This in turn will provide a new level of
deterrence for the aggressive licensing campaigns that patent trolls
employ.
A. Preliminary Injunctions: Reasonable Likelihood of Success
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo of the parties and to halt any further actions that may
cause damage to the plaintiff.198 Thus, this motion is filed early in
litigation.199 Generally, a plaintiff must prove four factors to have a
preliminary injunction granted:200 “[(1)] that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, [(2)] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, [(3)] that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and [(4)] that an injunction is in the public interest.”201
Similar to a buyer not needing to establish a “valid” claim under
the WAI, a party defending a preliminary injunction need not show
actual invalidity or noninfringement of the patent. Rather, at the
preliminary injunction stages the vulnerability of the patent is the
focus, with the patent’s validity and/or noninfringement saved for

198. See Abbott Labs, 544 F.3d at 1345 (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Cameniseh,
45 U.S. 390 (1981)).
199. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms. Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom, Abbott Labs v. Sandoz Inc., 544 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
200. While there are several modifiers used by courts other than reasonable,
such as “some” or “substantial,” commentators agree that this is merely a
distinction without a difference. See Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc.,
566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We note in passing that some cases state
the first factor as requiring a ‘reasonable’ likelihood of success on the merits. It
is not clear whether the addition of ‘reasonable’ adds anything substantive to the
test, but in any event, for our purposes the Supreme Court’s current statement of
the test is the definitive one.”) (footnotes omitted). See also Abbott Labs, 452
F.3d at 1332 (requiring “some likelihood of success on the merits”); Sanofi, S.A.
v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.N.J.) (requiring
“reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation”).
201. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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trial.202 Courts balance these four factors and allow for variations
within the facts as well as the law involved. Here, the focus is
solely on the first factor—likelihood of success on the merits—and
how courts conduct this analysis regarding patents, trademarks,
and copyrights.
1. Patent
For a patent preliminary injunction, a federal court compares
the scope of the asserted patent with the allegedly infringing
conduct.203 This comparison requires courts to interpret the
meaning of the claims of the patent. This process is most often
termed “claim construction.”204 The scope and the meaning of a
patent are “indeterminate until interpreted by a court.”205 The
federal district court will interpret, or “construct,” the claims that
makeup a patent and decide where the “metes and bounds” of the
patent lie.206 During claim construction, the district court looks
first to the intrinsic evidence, including the patent claims,
specification, and prosecution history.207 If needed, as is common,
the court will then look to extrinsic evidence for guidance, such as
dictionaries, cases where courts have construed the same or similar
terms contained in the patent at issue, published literature, and

202. Abbott Labs, 544 F.3d at 1363. Similarly, “[t]he correct standard is not
whether a substantial question has been raised, but whether the patentee is likely
to succeed on the merits . . . [t]o hold that a defendant may defeat a preliminary
injunction by raising a ‘substantial question’ that may render the patent
‘vulnerable’ would conflict with Supreme Court precedent and with the
precedent of every regional circuit.” Id. at 1364–65.
203. Note that this is the type of analysis the 84 Lumber court stated should
be performed when determining whether a “rightful claim” has been made by a
third party—a comparison of the “scope of the patents at issue with the allegedly
infringing products.” 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675,
680 (D. Pa. 2001).
204. See Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2008) (discussing that a patent
infringement analysis first requires a construction of the patent claims and then a
comparison of the claims to the allegedly infringing conduct).
205. OPDERBECK, supra note 1, at 159 n.226.
206. See id.; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign
Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744
(2009) (“In modern American patent doctrine, we define what the patentee owns
. . . by what she claimed. Courts and commentators regularly analogize patent
claims as akin to the ‘metes and bounds’ of a real property dead, defining the
outer boundaries . . . conferred on the patentee.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
207. Chen, supra note 204, at 1173.
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expert testimony.208 Claim construction is reserved for a judge, not
a jury.209
Preliminary claim construction has a significant impact on the
likelihood of success factor of the preliminary injunction motion
even though the court still has three more factors to consider. For a
preliminary injunction the patent holder must also show that “it
will likely prove [the defendant’s] infringement, and that it will
likely withstand challenges, if any, to the validity of the patent.”210
This analysis considers the presumption of validity inherent in a
patent, and if the patent holder moves for a preliminary injunction
and the defendant fails to challenge validity,211 then the “very
existence of the patent with its concomitant presumption of
validity satisfies the patentee’s burden of showing a likelihood of
success on the validity issue.”212
An example of this type of likelihood analysis paired with a
claim construction is demonstrated in Abbott Laboratoies v.
Sandoz, Inc.213 Plaintiff patentee, Abbott Laboratories, brought an
action for patent infringement against its competitor Defendant,
Sandoz, based on its patents relating to extended release
formulations of the antibiotic drug clarithromycin.214 To prevent
any actual damage, because Sandoz had not yet started to market
or sell its version of the extended release clarithromycin, Abbott
Labs moved for a preliminary injunction. On the infringement
208. Id.
209. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)
(“[C]onstruction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is
exclusively within the province of the court.”); Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV
Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1328 (2008).
210. Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
211. A defendant may challenge the validity of a patent on the grounds of
patentability requirements, such as nonobviousness and enablement as well as
inequitable conduct before the PTO. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed.
2002)
212. Titan Tire Corp., 566 F.3d at 1377. Also, the court will view the “matter
in light of the burdens and presumptions that will inhere at trial.” Id. at 1376.
Accordingly, the patentee need not, at this stage, prove invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence. Instead, the patentee must show only that through the
evidence available at this early stage that there is a reasonable chance that he
will succeed at trial. Id. Importantly, here, validity is not at issue. The WAI has
not been extended to validity, presumably because of the actual language of the
statute itself limiting itself to “infringement.” Consequently, the only question
for the court to evaluate in the WAI context is whether the third-party’s
infringement claim will likely hold at trial.
213. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc. 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
214. Id. at 1343.
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portion of the motion,215 the Federal Circuit stated that the
infringement issue could be substantially resolved by the claim
construction of one phrase: “pharmaceutically acceptable
polymer.”216 This term of art is found in the written specification
of the patent at issue, which lists only water-soluble hydrophilic
polymers. Accordingly, if the term was construed strictly to
include only the polymers named in the specification, then there
could be no literal infringement because Sandoz’s generic version
of clarithromycin used none of the identified polymers.217 If the
court decided that other, unnamed pharmaceutically acceptable
polymers were covered by the construction of “pharmaceutically
acceptable polymer,” then literal infringement would be likely.218
Consequently, Sandoz argued to limit the construction to those
named polymers—water-soluble hydrophilic polymers.219
In briefing of how the term should be construed, parties often
identify other instances when the term has been defined in meaning
and scope. “Pharmaceutically acceptable polymer” had been
discussed in previous litigations, and twice in the Federal
Circuit.220 The Federal Circuit here agreed with the district court
on “the fact that some methacrylic acid copolymers are waterinsoluble does not require limiting ‘pharmaceutically acceptable
polymer’ to the named polymers.”221 Overall, and after similar
claim constructions of “matrix” and an analysis of the difference
between “polymer” and “excipient” were conducted, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Abbott Laboratories
had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving infringement
at trial.222
While this type of analysis to determine whether a rightful
claim exists may seem burdensome, this is precisely what a patent
attorney is trained to do. Charts are created, words are defined, and
215. Defendant Sandoz objected to the preliminary injunction motion by also
challenging the validity of the patent. I will not discuss this here as it is not
relevant to what a court would be faced with in a WAI action. Only
infringement is at issue under the WAI.
216. Abbott Labs, 544 F.3d at 1358.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1359. Sandoz’s drug contains water-insoluble polymers. Because
infringement requires that every claim limitation is present in the allegedly
infringing product, companies often try to design around the patent. Here, that
may have been the case, and, if so, plaintiff Abbot Labs did a good job of
ferreting out the argument that the polymers identified were merely examples of
the type that could be used, instead of an exhaustive list.
220. See id. at 1358.
221. Id. at 1359.
222. Id. at 1361.
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comparisons are made.223 Because a patent holder must prove, for
a literal infringement claim, that every single element of a claim is
infringed by the product, defining the boundaries of the patent and
the alleged infringing product often gives the parties insight into
whether infringement is likely. Because of this insight, claim
construction is considered “outcome determinative” and “often the
first and last step in patent disputes.”224
2. Trademark & Copyright
The first factor of preliminary injunctions—whether there is a
likelihood of success on the merits—is also context-specific for
trademark and copyright infringement claims. For trademark
infringement,
the plaintiff’s probability of success on the merits depends
on the strength of its trademark infringement claim, which
in turn requires a showing that the plaintiff’s “mark was
used in commerce by the defendant without the registrant’s
consent and that the unauthorized use was likely to deceive,
cause confusion, or result in mistake.”225
The party moving for a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement case must initially demonstrate that it was the first to
use the mark in commerce. The plaintiff must demonstrate that
“(1) its case has some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that
no adequate remedy at law exists; and (3) it will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is not granted.”226
This determination may be simple when the facts show, for
example, a holdout licensee’s near-exact imitation or clearly
unlawful use of a mark.227 In other cases this determination
requires a more in-depth look at the nature and use of the similar
trademarks. The question for the court acting as factfinder in these
cases is one of proximity. The court will employ some or all of the
223. Depending on the technology involved, these comparison–contrast
charts may be completed in just a few days, or if a more in-depth analysis is
needed (either because the technology is highly sophisticated or the value of the
patented technology so substantial), a few weeks.
224. Chen, supra note 204, at 1169.
225. Mont. Prof’l Sports, L.L.C. v. Leisure Sports Mgmt., Inc., 422 F. Supp.
2d 1271, 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (quoting McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147
F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998)).
226. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001).
Although various circuits have slightly different wording of these factors and
different requirements, this is not important for this limited preliminary
injunction discussion.
227. 35 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (1996).
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following factors: the strength of the trademark, the degree of
similarity between the two trademarks, the proximity of the
products in the marketplace, the likelihood that the prior owner
will move into the junior user’s market, instances of actual
consumer confusion, the degree of the junior user’s good faith in
adopting its trademark, and, finally, the sophistication of the
purchasers.228 When two products are competing in the same
market, a simple side-by-side comparison is insufficient. Rather,
an analysis “focusing on actual market conditions and the type of
confusion alleged” is required.229
An example of this analysis in the preliminary injunction
context is Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc.230 This trademark
infringement suit involved the plush toys under the trademark
name “Beanie Babies.” Ty began selling the plush toys in 1993,
and they quickly became a smashing success—selling over one
billion Beanie Babies by the time of the trial.231 The Jones Group,
a NASCAR licensee, began manufacturing and selling bean-filled
replicas of NASCAR racing cars in 1998—named Beanie
Racers.232 After an unsuccessful cease-and-desist letter, Ty filed
suit and shortly thereafter moved for a preliminary injunction
against Jones that would prohibit it from selling any more of its
Beanie Racers until the suit’s outcome determined the parties’
respective rights.233
Keeping the focus on the first factor, likelihood of success on
the merits at trial, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by
determining whether consumers would likely be confused as to the
origin or source of the Beanie Racers. The seven factors listed to
aid in this determination are very similar to the traditional Polaroid
factors,234 yet the court utilized the following factors the most:

228. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961).
229. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 112
(2d Cir. 2006).
230. Ty, 237 F.3d at 891.
231. Id. at 895.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. The Seventh Circuit uses the following seven factors to determine
whether a likelihood of confusion to a consumer exists: “(1) the similarity of the
marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the
area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be used by
consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (6) whether any actual
confusion exists; and (7) the defendant’s intent to palm off its goods as those of
the plaintiffs.” Id. at 897 (citing Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight
Co., Inc., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977)).
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similarity of the marks and products, and the area and concurrent
use of the products.235
Regarding similarity of the marks, the court noted that the
confusion between the two marks “Beanie Babies” and “Beanie
Racers” was in the word “Beanie.”236 The court did find that the
tags on the plush toys were distinctive—consumers would likely
notice the difference in a side-by-side comparison.237 Yet, the court
was not convinced that consumers would recognize the different
sources if the two toys were not side-by-side.238 The court affirmed
the lower court’s finding that “Beanie” was a “salient aspect of
Ty’s product”239 and that the other features on the tags were
diminished because of that aspect. Likewise, the similarity of the
products themselves weighed in Ty’s favor because both products
are made from velvet boa-type fabric, are eight to nine inches long,
and are filled with pellet-like materials.240 Concerning the area and
manner of concurrent use, the court found must determine
“whether ‘there is a relationship in use, promotion, distribution, or
sales between the goods or services of the parties.’”241
The evidence showed that both parties sold their plush toys to
specialty-gift shops, that the toys were likely sold in the same spot
in the most stores, that the parties advertised in many of the same
magazines, and yet also that the target audiences were likely at a
bit of odds (with younger females being the target audience of
“Beanie Babies” and the NASCAR fan base historically consisting
of men, not women or children).242 Although not all the factors
weighed in Ty’s favor, the Seventh Circuit still upheld the
magistrate judge’s opinion that Ty demonstrated “some likelihood
of succeeding on the merits.”243 After considering the other factors,
235. See generally id. at 898–901 (discussing the similarity of marks,
similarity of products, and the area and manner of concurrent use in the majority
of the opinion on whether plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success at trial).
More commonly, similarity of the marks, intent of the defendant, and evidence
of actual confusion are the three most important factors. Id. at 898 (citing G.
Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 999 (7th
Cir. 1989)). Yet as this case shows, this is a very case-specific, fact-intensive
analysis, and sometimes other factors are more important because of unique
facts.
236. See id. at 898.
237. Id. at 899.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 900 (quoting Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d
434, 442 (7th Cir. 1990)).
242. See id. at 900–01.
243. Id. at 902.
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such as the balancing of harms, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
grant of the preliminary injunction to Ty.244
The preliminary injunction factors in a copyright infringement
suit are similar to those of patent and trademark infringement,
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits, which will then create a presumption of irreparable harm,
or a “fair chance of success on the merits” with the relativehardships factor weighing strongly in the movant’s favor.245
Specific to copyright infringement, the plaintiff must first show
that it has registered its work with the U.S. Copyright Office and
then prove that the alleged infringer has copied original elements
of the work.246 The actual-copying requirement is often broken
down into two separate inquiries. “First, the copyright holder must
show that, as a factual matter, the putative infringer copied the
protected work. Second, the holder must show that the copying
was so egregious as to render the allegedly infringing and infringed
works substantially similar.”247 Actual copying is best
demonstrated by proving the alleged infringer had access to the
original work and that direct copying was not only plausible, but
that there is substantial similarity when the two expressions are
compared. When the works are “so alike that the later
(unprotected) work can fairly be regarded as appropriating the
original expression of the earlier (protected) work[,]” the court will
deem the works substantially similar.248
Accordingly, for the first step in a motion for a preliminary
injunction in a copyright infringement suit, the movant must
demonstrate to the court that it has a registered copyright. Second,
the movant must show that it has either a probability or fair chance
of success on the merits. This is accomplished by arguing that
actual, unauthorized copying has occurred.249 This copying of
original elements will show that the unauthorized copying created
two substantially similar works.

244. Id. at 903–04.
245. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
246. Id. Note here that a copyright is not invalid without a registration,
though it must be registered before litigation regarding the copyright can
commence.
247. Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
248. Id. at 67.
249. The most used route is to show likelihood of success, so that the
presumption of irreparable harm attaches and the motion granted. See Jacobsen,
535 F.3d at 1378–79.
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B. The Standard Applied
We know from Part II that a rightful claim should “fall
somewhere between purely frivolous claims, at one end, and
claims where liability has been proven, at the other.”250 We also
know that state courts have recently broadened the definition of
rightful, finding that a rightful claim is any nonfrivolous, thirdparty claim that causes some voluntarily adverse affect.251 This
may be proven by as little as a cease-and-desist letter.252 This
broad interpretation and lack of structured analysis fails to provide
the right incentives for both buyers and third parties. To change
these incentives, yet retain the benefits of the WAI for buyers, I
propose that courts adopt a new and more rigorous framework for
determining when a rightful claim has been made by a third party.
This new framework with accompanying analysis will create a
unified understanding of the WAI, thereby enabling parties to
better manage expectations.
1. Reasonable Likelihood of Success
The question courts analyze when encountering a WAI claim
under this new framework is whether the third-party infringement
claim is (or was) reasonably likely to succeed on the merits at trial.
A court should ensure that any settlement entered into with a third
party was made in good faith as the UCC requires. This framework
requires an intellectual-property-specific analysis. Because both
federal courts (with patent, trademark, and copyright infringement
claims) and state courts (with trademark infringement claims)
perform this type of intellectual-property-specific analysis in
preliminary injunction motions, state courts should use these
established analyses as guidance.
For third-party patent infringement claims, the analysis aims to
determine the scope of the patent claims, and then to determine
whether the allegedly infringing product or process falls within
those limitations.253 The first step upon receiving a cease-anddesist letter is to have patent counsel look at the asserted patent and
compare it with the client’s good(s). This early form of claim
construction is most often manifested in claim charts, which will
250. 84 Lumber Co. v. MRK Techs., Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
251. See supra Part II.B.
252. See supra Part II.B.
253. This patent and product comparison is also key for those complex
products requiring the buyer to determine which seller, if any, may be
responsible for the third-party infringement claim.
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break down each claim of the patent and even further break down
that claim into the various limitations given in the particular claim.
These claim charts may be developed to the depth required by the
potential value of the patent, and are useful for any number of
responses to the cease-and-desist letter. The claim charts will
ultimately determine, along with the particular level of risk a
company is willing to bear, what response may be warranted. For
example, an attorney may send a letter back to the patent holder
identifying particular limitations of the patent that are not existent
in the allegedly infringing product or process, or conversely, make
a phone call to the patent holder to set up a meeting to discuss
licensing options.254
This informal claim construction will roughly identify the
strength of the infringement action. If the buyer decides to settle,
these claim charts will be the foundation of a claim construction
brief to the court in a WAI action. The court assessing the viability
of the WAI action will go through the same claim construction
analysis that federal courts do with patent preliminary injunction
motions. The claim construction will not be akin to a Markman
hearing—the final claim construction in a patent infringement
suit255––instead, a more shallow analysis of the technology at issue
will be conducted. If the patent infringement suit has a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, determined by comparing the
construed claims to the allegedly infringing good, then the court
may award relief under the WAI. Although the WAI may still
result in seemingly unfair results for sellers that were unaware their
manufactured goods potentially infringed a patent, it nevertheless
provides a fairer and more judicious process for all parties
involved in the WAI.256
This stricter standard for determining when a rightful claim is
made will still protect buyers under the WAI from meritorious
infringement actions, and it will discourage the massive,
impersonal, and overly aggressive licensing-campaign suits that
are targeting easy settlements. No longer will a buyer have the
right to settle without assessing whether the claim against it is
likely to succeed. Instead, the buyer has the burden to prove it
should be accorded relief from the seller.
254. Another common answer is that the patent is likely invalid based on
obviousness or nonenablement. If the buyer chooses to not settle based on these
grounds, even though it may likely infringe, a seller is not responsible for the
cost or outcome of this defense to a patent infringement suit. Simply, the WAI
only covers assertions of noninfringement, not challenges to a patent.
255. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
256. This is also consistent with the representational theories of warranty
law. See supra Part III.
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For a third-party trademark or copyright infringement claim,
the process is a bit simpler. The trademark infringement analysis
turns on whether the junior user’s mark will confuse consumers.
This analysis is highly factual and involves a court evaluating any
number of the traditional Polaroid factors (for example, the
similarity of the marks and products sold by the companies, and
intent of the junior user). This analysis is performed exactly like
that in the preliminary injunction process and will therefore be
familiar territory for a state or federal court determining whether a
rightful claim of trademark infringement was brought against a
buyer.
For a third-party copyright infringement claim, the first step in
determining whether the third party made a rightful claim against a
buyer is verifying that the asserted copyright is registered with the
U.S. Copyright Office. Second, the court must determine whether
the seller copied original elements of the third-party’s registered
copyright. Recall that a valid claim is not the standard here.
Instead, the standard is that the claim is reasonably likely to
succeed on the merits. Factual determinations, such as a former
employee or competitor’s exposure to source code, will help
substantiate a copyright infringement claim. If the works are
substantially similar, the reasonable-likelihood-of-success hurdle
may be met without a huge endeavor into the origins and creation
of the source code.
Overall, this more rigorous standard for determining when a
claim is rightful is in line with current case law as well as the
initial parameters set with the WAI. No determination that there is
in fact infringement is necessary or that a valid third-party claim
exists. Rather, the only determination necessary is whether there is
a reasonable likelihood that the third party would (or would have if
it settled) succeed on its infringement claim at trial.
2. Settled with Good Faith
Further, when faced with a WAI claim where a settlement has
already been entered by the buyer and third party, and, therefore,
the buyer is suing the seller to recover its losses, the court should
ensure that any settlement agreement was entered in good faith.
Under the UCC, good faith for sales transactions requires “honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing.”257 The first part, honesty in fact, is “often referred to
as the subjective component of good faith,” while the second part,
reasonable commercial standards, “is referred to as the objective
257. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2010).
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component of good faith.”258 This “subjective” part of the goodfaith obligation has been referred to as the businessperson who
may be “empty of head but good of heart.”259 Under this first part,
a party must show that it had an “honest belief in the legitimacy of
the transaction.”260 This honesty requirement differs from the
reasonable or objective standard where a party must not only have
been honest in its transaction and conduct, but also knowledgeable
in its specific trade with behavior typical to those in its field.261 A
party may meet this requirement by demonstrating to the court the
legitimacy of its actions and reasonableness of the settlement. This
can be analyzed by looking at the terms of the settlement, namely
the amount of licensing fees in comparison to the strength of the
infringement claim and value of the patented technology.
This good-faith requirement is especially important in cases
where infringement liability is easily provable. This occurs more
frequently in trademark and copyright, where actual copying or use
of a registered trademark or–copyright or counterfeiting of goods
is easily determinable. In these cases, the infringing buyer has little
to no bargaining power for settlement negotiations. Conceivably,
the buyer will be upset with the seller for selling them goods so
obviously in violation of another’s rights. Because of this, good
faith is necessary to show the reasonableness of the settlement.
A recent example of this is Apple reportedly paying at least $1
million to settle a trademark infringement suit against it for using
the term “iAds.”262 This trademark, “iAds,” was first used in 2006
by an online ad agency based in Los Angeles, Innovate Media,
who then received two trademark registrations for the mark in
October 2008.263 Steve Jobs announced (on behalf of Apple on
April 8, 2010) the new “iAds” program; Innovate Media sued just
one month later. Reportedly, the two companies settled quietly in
July.264 Having deep pockets to go after and clear infringement of a
registered trademark, it was in Apple’s best interests to settle
quickly with Innovate Media. If Apple had licensed another to use
this “iAds” trademark and had, therefore, been liable for any
258. United Energy Distribs., Inc. v. Conocophillips Co., 66 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d 997 (D.S.C. 2008).
259. Boris Kozolchyk, Preparatory Reading Materials, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 349, 373–74 (2010).
260. Donald R. Cassling, Banking Briefs, 127 BANK. L.J. 476, 481 (2010).
261. Kozolchyk, supra note 259, at 374.
262. Greg Sandoval, Did Apple Pay Big Bucks in iAd Settlement?, CNET
NEWS (Nov. 1, 2010 10:18 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-2002136137.html.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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resulting losses from an infringement claim, the buyer would need
to demonstrate, if challenged by Apple, that the settlement amount
was reasonable.
Like with the body of preliminary injunction law, employing
the well-established doctrine of good faith under the UCC gives
courts parameters and existing law to look to for guidance. A case
where this would have been helpful is Acushnet Co. v. G.I. Joe’s,
Inc.265 This case involved G.I. Joe’s, a golf ball seller, who
purchased “Titleist” golf balls from Cam Golf.266 Acushnet is the
actual manufacturer of the “Titleist” golf ball and sued G.I. Joe’s
for infringement after it had discovered G.I. Joe’s was selling
counterfeits.267 G.I. Joe’s first discovered that the golf balls it
bought from Cam Golf were counterfeits when a customer
complained about the laminate on the balls coming off after just
one round of golf.268 G.I. Joe’s quickly pulled its remaining stock
of the “Titleist” golf balls, but not before another customer of G.I.
Joe’s had complained to Acushnet.269 Acushnet promptly sued
based on the Lanham Act against G.I. Joe’s, who then filed a thirdparty complaint against Cam Golf for breaching the WAI.270
Subsequently, Acushnet and G.I. Joe’s settled for $25,000. G.I.
Joe’s also incurred $19,350 in attorney’s fees defending against
Acushnet.271 G.I. Joe’s then sought damages from Cam Golf
pursuant to Oregon’s equivalent of the WAI, and Cam Golf argued
that the settlement was unreasonable.272 G.I. Joe’s asked the
district court for “the difference at the time and place of acceptance
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted . . . [as well as]
consequential damages.”273 The consequential damages would
cover the settlement as well as attorney’s fees.
The district court had very little guidance on how to determine
whether the settlement was reasonable and whether the settlement
should be assessed under the Lanham Act or the WAI. Because
these issues were before the court on a summary judgment motion,
the court simply found that material issues of fact were present and
denied the motion of G.I. Joe’s. Instead of floundering for what
265. Acushnet Co. v. G.I. Joe’s, Inc., No. CV05-764-HU, 2006 WL 2729555
at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2006).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at *2.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *3.
273. Id.
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law to apply, a similarly situated court should follow my proposed
framework.
First, the court should determine whether the third-party’s
claim had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. In the
case above, establishing that the golf balls were counterfeit and
that the golf balls came from the accused seller would accomplish
this goal. Second, the court should determine whether the buyer
settled in good faith. This determination is made by analyzing the
process used in reaching the buyer’s financial obligations under the
settlement with the third party. Would a knowledgeable party make
a similar decision based on the value of the goods and potential
liability under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement? If so,
then the court can rest assured that the buyer has established a
rightful claim under the WAI and that the damages the buyer is
requesting from the seller is reasonable (in this case, costs and fees
associated with the settlement).
3. The Exception: Money and Sophistication
A predictable situation may arise justifying an exception to the
reasonably-likely-to-succeed standard. This is where the potential
liability is substantial and the technology is highly sophisticated,
making it difficult to determine the merit of the infringement
claim. If both these requirements are met, the buyer should receive
a presumption that it has a rightful claim, therefore shifting the
burden to the defendant–seller to show otherwise. The seller may
succeed in meeting this burden if it shows that the buyer did not
enter settle in good faith. For example, if the seller could
demonstrate that other similarly situated parties reasonably
knowledgeable in the same industry would have settled for
significantly less than the buyer did, then it has made a case that
the buyer was not in good faith in entering the licensing settlement.
Therefore, the buyer would not receive the amount of damages
requested, but only the damages that would have been reasonable
in a similar situation as demonstrated by the experts that the
defendant called.
A recent example of a high-dollar, sophisticated technology
case is Boston Scientific’s reported settlement with Johnson &
Johnson for an astounding $1.725 billion.274 This settlement
concerned patents describing coronary stents, and it is the second
high-dollar settlement Boston Scientific has reached with Johnson
274. Barry Meier, Boston Scientific to Pay $1.7 Billion to Settle Patent Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/
business/02device.html.
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& Johnson.275 The first settlement was for $716.3 million to the
Cordis division of Johnson & Johnson just months earlier.276
Although these settlements are on the extreme end of the spectrum,
parties frequently reach high dollar settlements, and this remains
true even when the infringement claim may not be as strong as
others. When the potential losses are extreme, a more conservative
approach is preferred.
Like the coronary stents above, these cases involve
complicated technology that is difficult to assess at an early stage.
In fact, in these cases, the parties are expected to go all the way to
the Markman hearing (the final claim construction in a patent
litigation trial where experts opine on the potential infringement)
before having an honest understanding of whether infringement
has occurred.
CONCLUSION
Overall, courts need to tighten their standard for determining
when a rightful claim has been made, thereby entitling a party to
relief under the WAI. I argue here that courts should adopt a new
and more rigorous framework that is accompanied with an
intellectual-property-specific analysis. A party asserting a breach
of the WAI action must demonstrate that the infringement claim
against it had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.
Further, this party must show that if it settled with the third party it
did so in good faith. Establishing this new standard will cut down
on two troubling aspects of the current standard. One, it motivates
the party accused of infringing to play the settlement game with
more internalized notions of the consequences and outcomes of its
actions. Two, patent trolls and other aggressive patentees will be
deterred in their licensing campaigns when the buyers they sue no
longer make a quick, under-reasoned decision to buy a license.
Instead, these aggressive, often abusive parties will be forced to
defend their infringement claims.

275. Id.
276. Id.

